Making the Case for Syria Intervention

Sen. Bob Casey had an op-ed in Foreign Policy yesterday calling on the United States to "provide non-lethal equipment to vetted elements of the Free Syrian Army." It appears the Obama administration isn't quite ready to do that, as Secretary of State Kerry announced the U.S. would provide military rations and medical equipment. Unfortunately, it's another too tentative step by the Obama administration regarding Syria. I've had my conversion on this issue and I just keep hoping the administration would catch up. Apparently so does Sen. Casey.

As much as I agree with giving non-lethal aid to vetted (how do we do that, I'm not sure) elements of the FSA, there are still a couple things I disagree with in his op-ed. First, I just don't agree with this statement:

Inaction could have grave regional consequences and serve to empower Iran at a time of nuclear uncertainty and embolden Hezbollah, a terrorist organization that has proven its ability and intent to strike in and outside the Middle East.

Now maybe, maybe if Assad is able to crush this rebellion the above statement would be true, but I think we're over the tipping point. There is no going back to status quo ante (you share a blog with a lawyer long enough). Coming from that perspective, state implosion holds little prospects for Iran or Hezbollah. Perhaps they could benefit from the chaos, but they're all in with Assad and his regime, which would make any pivot to a new puppet really difficult. No, the real danger in the unmanaged implosion of Syria is the rise of an Islamic extremist state or safe haven. Sen. Casey fails to mention that threat and instead it feels like he's pandering by raising the specter of Iran (though I'd likely say the same thing if he invoked AQ too).

The second thing I question is if indeed our substantive aid, at this point, would really gain us many friends among the Syrian people. Or rather, would we just be laying the groundwork for the next authoritarians? Now this isn't a reason to not do it, but to think we give them non-lethal and maybe even lethal aid and then they're our friends when Assad falls is a bit of wishful thinking. It's especially wishful thinking in light of our Afghan and Libyan experiences in the most recent past. Again, not a reason to do nothing, but not a good reason to sell it to the American people.

On the whole, I'm with Sen. Casey here and it's hard to sell this sort of thing to the American people, but some of the reasons he outlines misstate the real threat or overstate the real benefit. Let's give the FSA non-lethal aid straight away, but let's be real honest on the situation when we do it.

Syria: Weapons from Croatia and Money from Saudi Arabia

Following on my last couple posts on Syria, comes The New York Times article that reports a substantial shipment of Yugoslav weapons from Croatia  paid for by Saudi Arabia, and routed through Jordan have been handed off to the rebels inside Syria. It is entirely possible this sort of thing happens without tacit U.S. approval, but I think that's unlikely.

I want to real quick talk about two things in the report. First the claim that "The weapons' distribution has been principally to armed groups viewed as nationalist and secular." There is a lot of wiggle room in that sentence and since Croatia, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan haven't commented on the shipments, I'm curious how the reporters know this is the case? Is it just the intel from photos and videos of secular and nationalist holding these weapons? It's not clearly articulated in the article and it gives me pause.

The second question is if Jordan might have exposed itself to reprisals either from Syria or Hezbollah but reportedly getting these weapons into Syria and to the rebels? I'm very curious how the Assad regime might respond if the reports are substantiated by Syrian intelligence. Without a doubt, they have other things to take up their time, but still. I'd also be curious if Iran utilizes Hezbollah to execute reprisals in Jordan. Jordan is different from Turkey and Saudi Arabia at this point because there is still an undercurrent of political unrest in the country. There is an opportunity, if even a slim one, for an outside party to foment further unrest.

I don't have answers to either of these questions, but as I read the reports I'm encourage there is an effort on any level being made to end the stalemate, but who actually winds up with the guns and what it means for Syria's neighbors remains a concern for me.

Syria: Is the Enemy of My Enemy My Friend?

Leslie Gelb, writing in the Daily Beast, has an article advocating the broad outlines of what productive US engagement with the crisis in Syria might look like. The whole strategy Gelb outlines is predicated on one simple notion: Neither Assad loyalists, nor those loyal to the Syrian National Council and affiliated groups want to see a Syria ruled by Islamic extremists who may or may not have ties with Al Qaeda. Conveniently  this notion is also very much aligned with U.S. and Iranian interests in Syria, as the former doesn't want a terrorist safe haven and the latter can't afford a bastion of Sunni extremism in what was once a proxy state.

I think there's a lot right with this approach, but I want to touch on a couple things that I think skew the reality a bit. First, as a sign of good will to the Alawites Gelb argues the U.S. should "ensure that neither its European nor its regional allies gave arms to groups suspected of being even slightly jihadi in nature." But how can the U.S. actually do this? Even if we could identify the groups that aren't "slightly jihadi" how could we prevent KSA or Qatar from taking a different tact? Historically our gulf friends have smiled and nodded as we made requests and done what the wanted to do anyway. Furthermore, Gelb undermines his own case for arming Syrian groups when he notes that "Arabs all look alike to Americans, even CIA operatives." If we have such a hard time identifying the "right" people just generally, how can we be expected to do so in the cacophonous milieu of Syria today?

The second challenge is how we provide arms to the right people publicly enough that the Alawites know we're a benevolent interloper, while also ensuring we don't undermine the legitimacy of the groups we arm. Let's not kid ourselves that both the Alawites and the jihadis would make great public relations hay of public U.S. selective intervention. This has been the catch 22 of U.S. engagement in the region for years. Do nothing and we are criticized as allowing slaughter, do something and you undermine the legitimacy of the people you're trying to help. Remember that intervention in Syria hasn't received a GCC blessing. 

I know, to some extent, the above contradicts my previous post on Syria. But I think Gelb's goal and my goal are different. Gelb wants to arm these selected groups, not to tip the scales in the conflict, but to send a signal to the Alawites. I tend to think the goal should be arming them so they can take decisive action to hasten an end to the conflict. Gelb's point that about the dynamic of violence is well taken, but if you arm the "right" rebels, acknowledging the challenges that creates, and you work back channels centered around Gelb's overarching premise, which I think is 100% correct, suddenly you have a regime losing militarily and wondering if the Al Nusra Front or more moderate Syrian rebels will take Damascus first. 

Status quo results in a long, bloody decline on both sides. In so far as identifying, arming, and assisting the "right" rebels can change the underlying equation I think it might hasten the Assad government to the negotiating table and strengthen the position of said "right" rebels. Gelb is certainly on to something here and it's almost the best of a lot of bad options if only because its organizing principle is on point and resonant with almost all the disparate parties involved.

On Syria: I've Changed My Mind

The New York Times is reporting today that President Obama may be reconsidering his earlier decision to not arm the rebels in Syria. Over the past several weeks, I've been wondering where I stood on this and realized something. I've changed my mind. I believe we should be providing material military assistance to select factions of the Syrian rebel force in several ways. I'll get to how I think we should assist, but first thought it would be more important why I changed my mind.

For me, there are four reasons we should now assist, when in the past I have avoided this. First, I'm always hesitant for the US to get involved with a rebel group until some turning point has been reached. In Syria, it meant the odds needed to be greater that Assad's regime would fall versus maintaining control. Here two weeks back the rebels made overtures to Assad to come to a negotiating table and end the fighting. I believe, to this point, Assad has simply not responded. No pronouncements of defiance, no refusal, just silence. I read this as a sign he wants to keep that door open. When a proud man feels a noose overhead, it's never a good idea to spit at the hangman. But you also don't act in defiance if you know the probability your regime will fall is slightly greater than the alternative. I'm confident, at this point, that there's no going back. Assad's government will fall, it's just a question of lives lost and time.

The second reason is this article citing former Secretary of State Clinton noting that Syrian rebels are receiving messages from parts of Pakistan known to be outposts of Al Qaeda. This is a serious problem because it means those disreputable elements in Pakistan may be assisting some factions in Syria with foreign fighters with an Islamic extremist character and little interest in a secure, moderate Syria post-Assad.

This leads me to the third reason. Put simply the Al-Nusra Front. A fighting group the US has deemed a terrorist organization, they have been highly effective fighters against Assad's government with solid gains on their record. This reason, taken with the last reason, mean we're looking at a hellish brew of Islamic extremist groups winning battles, having arms, and looking to be key parts of a post-Assad regime.

The fourth reason comes from the New York Times piece, citing how Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah are helping prop up their client, Assad. And there's this story of an Iranian Guard commander being killed in Syria. I'm quite confident that already some of our allies in the region are helping get some arms into Syria, likely with our tacit approval. Generally speaking, I detest proxy conflicts. I think it's a dastardly way to fight and damage a foe when you lack the means of conviction to do it face to face (Disclaimer: I am not saying we're better off with a hot war with Russia, Iran, or Hezbollah. More a statement of ideological inclination then policy conviction). But my detesting of the method doesn't preclude the realist in me from thinking we should sit out maintaining purity and losing strategically. I think if there are meddlers, at this point, we ought to meddle as well, insomuch as our Syrian rebel allies would like.

I've pulled a one eighty on this issue. I think we should send arms, military advisers, and political advisers to Syria. I think the rebels need better weapons and better military training. I think we also need civilians on the ground now working with the rebel leadership we have identified as our allies and begin equipping them with the civil society knowledge they'll need to be an attractive alternative to Al Nusra and its Salifist sympathizers.

We've seen this play out before. A country held under the thumb of a dictator and his repressive security apparatus fights and throws off the chains of its dictator. But time and again, we've seen how the revolution was the easy part. It's the governing and compromising that proves a challenges. In so far as the United States can serve as a model and occasionally a helping hand, it should. I was content for the US to sit on the sidelines of this conflict for a long time, but now it's time to get into the game.

Kuwait is a Way Station for Syria

In The National there is an interesting story about how Kuwait is becoming a "back office of logistical support" for the rebels in Syria. It hasn't been news to hear gulf nations are supporting the rebels in Syria, particularly given the desire to counterbalance Iran in the broader region.  What makes the article striking is the myriad of groups raising money from within and without Kuwait to provide aid to the rebels, both lethal and non-lethal.  The impact of these organizations, perhaps less encumbered by the rules and restrictions of the UN, has been remarkable.

There is one more thing I want to pull out, and that's at the end of the article. As radical Islamic groups have come to the fore in Syria, these Kuwaiti groups have been providing less and less lethal aid. And yet Kuwaiti MP, Jamaan Al Harbash says that's hurts the rebels cause:

What is needed is that the FSA be authorised, officially, to acquire weapons of self-defence in a way that would enable it to prevail. The FSA must not be dealt with as a bunch of militant, opposition factions, it must rather be dealt with as an official body.
In fact, the FSA now is a large structure and if it was being supplied with a specific type of arms - especially anti-aircraft weaponry - that would enable it to finish off this battle in a month or two.

I asked yesterday who the Syrian opposition really is, and in the article I linked to there is increased pressure on the US to green light the transfer of weapons to the rebels. It's something I've been opposed to, but as it comes to light the rebels are communicating with folks in the tribal regions of Pakistan and as the Syrian National Council makes a serious overture to Assad for negotiations, I'm beginning to think the US may want to prepare to get more engaged, including considering targeted sharing of weapons to the Free Syrian Army. 

Who is the Syrian Opposition?

It's a question posed from time to time, but never fully answered. Take, for instance, the story at The New York Times about VP Biden's meeting with "the leader of the Syrian opposition council, Sheik Ahmad Moaz al-Khatib." I think it's excellent that the US is engaging with the opposition council, but call me jaded.

I remember Ahmed Chalabi and the opposition group he ran from outside of Iraq. He was a man who said everything would be great if the US invaded Iraq and he and his group fed us much of the intel that was used to justify the invasion.

Now every situation, indeed, every person is different. But I get nervous any time I hear US officials are meeting with an opposition council, especially in Munich, far from the fighting. I think it serves us well to be skeptical of the influence and control any such personage, or council can exercise. This is especially true when the Secretary of State is saying Syrian rebels are receiving messages from the tribal regions of Pakistan.

Sizing up the US/KSA relationship

A piece like the one Marc Lynch wrote at Foreign Policy comes out periodically, questioning the relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia.  It's a great relationship to question and I've done the same on occasion as well.

Our relationship with Saudi Arabia is complicated for more reasons than oil. Saudi Arabia, either with our explicit permission or acquiescence  spread money and resources around to groups that can and do needle Iranian interests in the region. I think it's fair to say the aid Saudi Arabia has given to Syrian rebels in dollars and weapons have helped sustain the fight there, but it's not a country remotely interested in becoming a liberal democracy. We need to square that circle, lest we continue to be enablers of Saudi Arabia in the future.