Syria: Is the Enemy of My Enemy My Friend?

Leslie Gelb, writing in the Daily Beast, has an article advocating the broad outlines of what productive US engagement with the crisis in Syria might look like. The whole strategy Gelb outlines is predicated on one simple notion: Neither Assad loyalists, nor those loyal to the Syrian National Council and affiliated groups want to see a Syria ruled by Islamic extremists who may or may not have ties with Al Qaeda. Conveniently  this notion is also very much aligned with U.S. and Iranian interests in Syria, as the former doesn't want a terrorist safe haven and the latter can't afford a bastion of Sunni extremism in what was once a proxy state.

I think there's a lot right with this approach, but I want to touch on a couple things that I think skew the reality a bit. First, as a sign of good will to the Alawites Gelb argues the U.S. should "ensure that neither its European nor its regional allies gave arms to groups suspected of being even slightly jihadi in nature." But how can the U.S. actually do this? Even if we could identify the groups that aren't "slightly jihadi" how could we prevent KSA or Qatar from taking a different tact? Historically our gulf friends have smiled and nodded as we made requests and done what the wanted to do anyway. Furthermore, Gelb undermines his own case for arming Syrian groups when he notes that "Arabs all look alike to Americans, even CIA operatives." If we have such a hard time identifying the "right" people just generally, how can we be expected to do so in the cacophonous milieu of Syria today?

The second challenge is how we provide arms to the right people publicly enough that the Alawites know we're a benevolent interloper, while also ensuring we don't undermine the legitimacy of the groups we arm. Let's not kid ourselves that both the Alawites and the jihadis would make great public relations hay of public U.S. selective intervention. This has been the catch 22 of U.S. engagement in the region for years. Do nothing and we are criticized as allowing slaughter, do something and you undermine the legitimacy of the people you're trying to help. Remember that intervention in Syria hasn't received a GCC blessing. 

I know, to some extent, the above contradicts my previous post on Syria. But I think Gelb's goal and my goal are different. Gelb wants to arm these selected groups, not to tip the scales in the conflict, but to send a signal to the Alawites. I tend to think the goal should be arming them so they can take decisive action to hasten an end to the conflict. Gelb's point that about the dynamic of violence is well taken, but if you arm the "right" rebels, acknowledging the challenges that creates, and you work back channels centered around Gelb's overarching premise, which I think is 100% correct, suddenly you have a regime losing militarily and wondering if the Al Nusra Front or more moderate Syrian rebels will take Damascus first. 

Status quo results in a long, bloody decline on both sides. In so far as identifying, arming, and assisting the "right" rebels can change the underlying equation I think it might hasten the Assad government to the negotiating table and strengthen the position of said "right" rebels. Gelb is certainly on to something here and it's almost the best of a lot of bad options if only because its organizing principle is on point and resonant with almost all the disparate parties involved.