The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction has released its final report, as many of noted, just before the 10th anniversary of the Iraq invasion. Of course there are the news stories focused on the waste and solid post hoc analysis on Iraq that doesn't help us plan forward. But there are some good lessons learned in the report and first I'd like to highlight a few of these that will be heavy lifts, but essential to improve government stabilization and reconstruction efforts. They are:
I find number 7 to be a little laughable for one reason. We did have a plan in Iraq. The plan Rumsfeld pushed was a get-in, get-out plan that didn't anticipate a lengthy occupation. Without a doubt more backup plans could have been on offer, but how do you effectively argue that 7 wasn't followed? What happens if all the assumptions the leading planners had turned out to be false? All the plans in the world don't amount to a thing if the assumptions you used to build those plans on are all wrong.
I think all the lessons learn reported by the SIGIR are solid lessons. Some have more of chance of being implemented than others, but I think the report fails to highlight perhaps the biggest lesson of all: We shouldn't unilaterally engage in forced regime change and reconstruction operations again. All do respect to the "Coalition of the Willing," but what were we thinking doing this without the explicit endorsement of the broader international community? I don't ask this to go back and re-litigate the past, but rather to look into the future and suggest that maybe before we gear up for regime change, we remember the lessons learned in Iraq (and still being learned in Afghanistan). As effective as our military, our diplomats and our aid programs are, they can't be expected to mobilize in haste and coherence to help remake a nation.
I also want to be really clear about something else. There is a vital role for the US government in conflict situations around the world and I am not suggesting the abandonment of contingency operations. Steps can and should be taken to improve our systems in executing contingency operations. All I'm saying is that the chief lesson from the Iraq War is that we shouldn't look to repeat the Iraq War. The other lessons learned outlined by SIGIR are great incremental steps that, if implemented, would help us be more effective in our contingency operations, but the chief lesson to learn from the SIGIR report is that unilateral military adventurism very rarely, if ever, gives you the positive result you expected it to.
1) Create an integrated civilian military office to plan, execute, and be accountable for contingency rebuilding activities during stabilization and reconstruction operations.I have to tell you, from past professional experiences, you have got to get 1 and 4 done if you want to ensure the money that gets spent gets spent more wisely than it was in Iraq. That said, it's going to be nearly impossible to get 1 and 4 done because of existing bureaucratic hurdles. There are vehicles for integration, but are they valued by the individual departments? There are information management systems in place, but will Congress allow DOD, State, and USAID to pool resources so they all have a same or similar system that meets the disparate needs of these disparate agencies? Does such a system exist and if not is the government willing to pay to have it developed? I have my doubts.
4) Establish uniform contracting, personnel, and information management systems that all SRO participants use.
7) Plan in advance, plan comprehensively and in an integrated fashion, and have backup plans ready to go.
I find number 7 to be a little laughable for one reason. We did have a plan in Iraq. The plan Rumsfeld pushed was a get-in, get-out plan that didn't anticipate a lengthy occupation. Without a doubt more backup plans could have been on offer, but how do you effectively argue that 7 wasn't followed? What happens if all the assumptions the leading planners had turned out to be false? All the plans in the world don't amount to a thing if the assumptions you used to build those plans on are all wrong.
I think all the lessons learn reported by the SIGIR are solid lessons. Some have more of chance of being implemented than others, but I think the report fails to highlight perhaps the biggest lesson of all: We shouldn't unilaterally engage in forced regime change and reconstruction operations again. All do respect to the "Coalition of the Willing," but what were we thinking doing this without the explicit endorsement of the broader international community? I don't ask this to go back and re-litigate the past, but rather to look into the future and suggest that maybe before we gear up for regime change, we remember the lessons learned in Iraq (and still being learned in Afghanistan). As effective as our military, our diplomats and our aid programs are, they can't be expected to mobilize in haste and coherence to help remake a nation.
I also want to be really clear about something else. There is a vital role for the US government in conflict situations around the world and I am not suggesting the abandonment of contingency operations. Steps can and should be taken to improve our systems in executing contingency operations. All I'm saying is that the chief lesson from the Iraq War is that we shouldn't look to repeat the Iraq War. The other lessons learned outlined by SIGIR are great incremental steps that, if implemented, would help us be more effective in our contingency operations, but the chief lesson to learn from the SIGIR report is that unilateral military adventurism very rarely, if ever, gives you the positive result you expected it to.
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