On Syria: I've Changed My Mind

The New York Times is reporting today that President Obama may be reconsidering his earlier decision to not arm the rebels in Syria. Over the past several weeks, I've been wondering where I stood on this and realized something. I've changed my mind. I believe we should be providing material military assistance to select factions of the Syrian rebel force in several ways. I'll get to how I think we should assist, but first thought it would be more important why I changed my mind.

For me, there are four reasons we should now assist, when in the past I have avoided this. First, I'm always hesitant for the US to get involved with a rebel group until some turning point has been reached. In Syria, it meant the odds needed to be greater that Assad's regime would fall versus maintaining control. Here two weeks back the rebels made overtures to Assad to come to a negotiating table and end the fighting. I believe, to this point, Assad has simply not responded. No pronouncements of defiance, no refusal, just silence. I read this as a sign he wants to keep that door open. When a proud man feels a noose overhead, it's never a good idea to spit at the hangman. But you also don't act in defiance if you know the probability your regime will fall is slightly greater than the alternative. I'm confident, at this point, that there's no going back. Assad's government will fall, it's just a question of lives lost and time.

The second reason is this article citing former Secretary of State Clinton noting that Syrian rebels are receiving messages from parts of Pakistan known to be outposts of Al Qaeda. This is a serious problem because it means those disreputable elements in Pakistan may be assisting some factions in Syria with foreign fighters with an Islamic extremist character and little interest in a secure, moderate Syria post-Assad.

This leads me to the third reason. Put simply the Al-Nusra Front. A fighting group the US has deemed a terrorist organization, they have been highly effective fighters against Assad's government with solid gains on their record. This reason, taken with the last reason, mean we're looking at a hellish brew of Islamic extremist groups winning battles, having arms, and looking to be key parts of a post-Assad regime.

The fourth reason comes from the New York Times piece, citing how Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah are helping prop up their client, Assad. And there's this story of an Iranian Guard commander being killed in Syria. I'm quite confident that already some of our allies in the region are helping get some arms into Syria, likely with our tacit approval. Generally speaking, I detest proxy conflicts. I think it's a dastardly way to fight and damage a foe when you lack the means of conviction to do it face to face (Disclaimer: I am not saying we're better off with a hot war with Russia, Iran, or Hezbollah. More a statement of ideological inclination then policy conviction). But my detesting of the method doesn't preclude the realist in me from thinking we should sit out maintaining purity and losing strategically. I think if there are meddlers, at this point, we ought to meddle as well, insomuch as our Syrian rebel allies would like.

I've pulled a one eighty on this issue. I think we should send arms, military advisers, and political advisers to Syria. I think the rebels need better weapons and better military training. I think we also need civilians on the ground now working with the rebel leadership we have identified as our allies and begin equipping them with the civil society knowledge they'll need to be an attractive alternative to Al Nusra and its Salifist sympathizers.

We've seen this play out before. A country held under the thumb of a dictator and his repressive security apparatus fights and throws off the chains of its dictator. But time and again, we've seen how the revolution was the easy part. It's the governing and compromising that proves a challenges. In so far as the United States can serve as a model and occasionally a helping hand, it should. I was content for the US to sit on the sidelines of this conflict for a long time, but now it's time to get into the game.

Don't Mind this Secret Drone Base

Besides finding out the legal basis the US established to kill one of its citizens, we also found out that we have a previously secret drone base in Saudi Arabia. Suddenly the Brennen nomination hearing for CIA director has the potential to be prime time viewing. I've two reactions to both the news of this base and the impending nomination hearing.

1) We know there is an airstrip in Djibouti where drones routinely take off and land. And I appreciate that Yemen is a big place and acknowledge limited technical knowledge of the flight range of our drone fleet, but did we need a secret base? Or was it easier for the CIA to have a secret base in Saudi Arabia instead of flying drones out of Djibouti?

2) While the leaked memo justifying the targeting of Awlaki could come up, I don't know how much the broader drone program will. It seems like a popular program in the country and I wonder what kind of political mileage the GOP would get for disparaging it, especially since it's a resource the Bush administration employed (along with extraordinary rendition and enhance interrogation, which have gone by the wayside in this administration). In the end the hearing could be much ado about very little. 

Kuwait is a Way Station for Syria

In The National there is an interesting story about how Kuwait is becoming a "back office of logistical support" for the rebels in Syria. It hasn't been news to hear gulf nations are supporting the rebels in Syria, particularly given the desire to counterbalance Iran in the broader region.  What makes the article striking is the myriad of groups raising money from within and without Kuwait to provide aid to the rebels, both lethal and non-lethal.  The impact of these organizations, perhaps less encumbered by the rules and restrictions of the UN, has been remarkable.

There is one more thing I want to pull out, and that's at the end of the article. As radical Islamic groups have come to the fore in Syria, these Kuwaiti groups have been providing less and less lethal aid. And yet Kuwaiti MP, Jamaan Al Harbash says that's hurts the rebels cause:

What is needed is that the FSA be authorised, officially, to acquire weapons of self-defence in a way that would enable it to prevail. The FSA must not be dealt with as a bunch of militant, opposition factions, it must rather be dealt with as an official body.
In fact, the FSA now is a large structure and if it was being supplied with a specific type of arms - especially anti-aircraft weaponry - that would enable it to finish off this battle in a month or two.

I asked yesterday who the Syrian opposition really is, and in the article I linked to there is increased pressure on the US to green light the transfer of weapons to the rebels. It's something I've been opposed to, but as it comes to light the rebels are communicating with folks in the tribal regions of Pakistan and as the Syrian National Council makes a serious overture to Assad for negotiations, I'm beginning to think the US may want to prepare to get more engaged, including considering targeted sharing of weapons to the Free Syrian Army. 

Orwell & Iran

Over at Foreign Policy there's an interesting, if a big navel gazing, piece from Roland Elliott Brown. He works to draw parallels from Animal Farm and 1984 to Iran's captured revolution and current state. It's a great read that tries to coax how a novel intended to represent a communist revolution can be expanded to include a theologically driven one.

Who is the Syrian Opposition?

It's a question posed from time to time, but never fully answered. Take, for instance, the story at The New York Times about VP Biden's meeting with "the leader of the Syrian opposition council, Sheik Ahmad Moaz al-Khatib." I think it's excellent that the US is engaging with the opposition council, but call me jaded.

I remember Ahmed Chalabi and the opposition group he ran from outside of Iraq. He was a man who said everything would be great if the US invaded Iraq and he and his group fed us much of the intel that was used to justify the invasion.

Now every situation, indeed, every person is different. But I get nervous any time I hear US officials are meeting with an opposition council, especially in Munich, far from the fighting. I think it serves us well to be skeptical of the influence and control any such personage, or council can exercise. This is especially true when the Secretary of State is saying Syrian rebels are receiving messages from the tribal regions of Pakistan.

Sizing up the US/KSA relationship

A piece like the one Marc Lynch wrote at Foreign Policy comes out periodically, questioning the relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia.  It's a great relationship to question and I've done the same on occasion as well.

Our relationship with Saudi Arabia is complicated for more reasons than oil. Saudi Arabia, either with our explicit permission or acquiescence  spread money and resources around to groups that can and do needle Iranian interests in the region. I think it's fair to say the aid Saudi Arabia has given to Syrian rebels in dollars and weapons have helped sustain the fight there, but it's not a country remotely interested in becoming a liberal democracy. We need to square that circle, lest we continue to be enablers of Saudi Arabia in the future.

Hamas, Israel, Unfrozen Tax Revenues, & Coincidence

Today it was reported that Israel would release some of the tax revenue and customs payments it had withheld on behalf of the Palestinian Authority to said authority. Israel had withheld the money last month because of Palestine's successful bid to change its status at the United Nations.

Quite separately Haaretz is reporting that Khaled Meshal of Hamas's political bureau has accepted the idea of a two-state solution between Israel and Palestine. Mr. Meshal gave King Abdullah of Jordan permission to share this concession with President Obama (though perhaps not Haaretz).

I'm wondering if A isn't connected to B somehow. A good friend tells me Mr. Meshal has designs on the Palestine Liberation Organization chairmanship  Also, Mr. Meshal met with King Abdullah on Monday and Tony Blair met with Benjamin Netanyahu on Tuesday.  This is all conjecture on my part, and even to me feels way too linear and neat, but if the Hamas not running the Gaza Strip is moving toward accepting a two-state solution it would be an incredibly interesting development.

To be sure, the Israel-Palestine peace process is all but non-existent right now, but if it does get going again having a faction of Hamas receptive to a two-state solution it could change the underlying dynamics of the negotiations as compared to the past couple decades.

It's Worth It to Train Foreign Militaries

Over at Foreign Policy, John Norris has a rather pointed piece arguing the United States should be training far few foreign military officers than it is now. Some of his criticisms are very valid, most notably the lack of capacity for State Department Foreign Service Officers to fully monitor and provide oversight for foreign military assistance programs. These are programs largely under the purview of the State Department with implementation by the Defense Department.

But Mr. Norris goes down a treacherous path when suggesting we need a rubric in determining which countries we should assist. Certainly ideally we would want to engage with robust democracies, countries that have traditions of military subservience to civilian authority.  Trouble is, particularly for the more strategically important countries, that is rarely the case.

In perhaps a telling moment, Mr. Norris says:

[A] few months spent studying tactics and logistics in Kansas or Georgia rarely seems to slow down a power-hungry colonel when he is hell bent on toppling the elected government that just threatened to cut his budget.

Quite right, but how can we know which colonel has ambitions of a coup? And aren't we better served to have a relationship with that colonel? Could we not provide a moderating influence over his ambitions if we have a relationship with him?

The relationships developed as part of our foreign military assistance are real and strategically important, if intangible. I think there's a danger of pulling back engagement at our own long-term peril.  I would point to the pivot or re-balance to Asia that has been the talk in military circles. Given the lack of desire and resources for the United States to create more permanent or semi-permanent installations in Asia, foreign military assistance, training the militaries of our allies, providing foreign military assistance can help us re-balance on the cheap. If we intend to counter-balance a rising China, we need a long roster of friends and an expansive rolodex of contacts. Foreign military assistance gives us both. To set a bar instead of a floor, we imperil our own strategic initiatives.

Drone War Spreading to North Africa

We know about the not-so-secret US military installation in Djibouti, where drones take off and land often bound for Yemen or Somalia, but with the situation in Mali, the US is looking to get better eyes on what's going on.  With that in mind, Africom commander, General Ham, has begun seeking a military partnership with either Niger or Burkina Faso that would allow a permissive environment and base for US drones to launch from.

At this point the reported intention is intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), which is to say the drones won't be armed. Of course that could change quickly. It's good we're seeking military partnerships before operating in North Africa, but I share concerns by some in the State Department that it will feel like we're militarizing Africa. Even if they are meant for intelligence gathering, drones are military hardware and that just doesn't help the public image of the US abroad. It also feels a bit like taking the easy way out. We can't get on the ground intelligence, so we send up drones. Certainly it keeps members of the American intelligence community out of harm's way, but it also limits our knowledge while damaging our public image.

Side note: As much as I'm not a fan of this policy, I like that Africom is increasing military cooperation with countries on the continent. Activated less than four years ago (yeah, we didn't have a command for Africa until 2008), it's great to see it moving forward. I'm hoping that maybe these negotiations might lead to a permanent base on the continent that would allow Africom to be based in Africa, instead of Germany.

A Seized Boat, Yemen, and Iran

Yemeni authorities, with assistance from the US military, seized a dhow in Yemen's territorial waters. The boat was loaded with weapons, explosives, and cash. Yemeni authorities believe the boat's cargo originated in Iran, and the US agrees with that intelligence assessment. If that suspicion is confirmed, it would further complicate US-Iran relations.

The trouble is the Yemeni government has long used Iran as a boogey man, sometimes rightly, but often times to win political points. As to the goal Iran might have, most likely they are trying to "needle the Saudis" in every way possible.

The Wrong Points of Emphasis, Again

James Traub has a column over at Foreign Policy talking about nation-building and the anticipated withdrawal of US forces Afghanistan and with it a far decreased US commitment. Traub teaches nation-building and challenged his students to consider Haiti and Afghanistan as examples. His students' optimism was far greater then it would seem Traub's own. I have to take issue with a couple things though.

First, I think it's a mistake to separate the COIN strategy from the development strategy. They work hand in hand. Without a doubt the military and civilian ability and inclination to provide a sustained COIN surge is rather limited. We're seeing the limits of it in Afghanistan today, but to argue that we should divide out aid projects from defense projects is wrong-headed.

I would argue, if anything, the biggest issue has been the failure of the United States to capitalize on "whole of government" approaches to nation-building. State and USAID aren't used to, or excited to work with DOD on projects. Initially DOD was frustrated by the gaps in State and USAID's ability, but since they've been begging both agencies to do more. I think the problem in Afghanistan is more US and international entities not getting and living on the same page as it is about individual programs failing. Too much happened in a vacuum and that's just not going to work.

The second issue I have is with Traub's suggestion things are likely to get better if we give money directly to the Afghan government. It would seem a wildly optimistic view of the government in Kabul. What sort of leakage can we expect if we give the Afghan government $8 billion dollars, directly, in aid? What can we expect to trickle down to real people? I feel like Traub is suggesting we reward people for stealing elections.

A better nation-building strategy is to bring "whole of government" solutions to bear in partnership with vetted, transparent Afghan ministries. Let's not write check, let's collaborate on projects. I think it'd be more effective to be a partner in nation building rather than just doing alone or just writing checks.

The EU is not a Superpower

There's a lot wrong with this Anne Applebaum's column in today's Washington Post arguing the EU can be the world's policeman. Not the least of which is when you cite French affinity for Malian music as a reason the EU can be a military superpower.

But the single biggest problem is the moves made in recent days by the UK's Prime Minister to suggest there might be a referendum on whether the UK will remain a member of the union. Nevermind the UK never accepted the common currency. It's hard to take the mantle of "World's Policeman" when the stronger military power in the union is lurching toward the exit.

I like the increasing role some EU countries are taking in their old colonial haunts, helping ensure the U.S. isn't the only policeman on patrol. But me thinks Applebaum goes way to far to suggest the EU is capable or inclined to take the patrol on its own.

Diplomacy isn't Dead

Writing in the New York Times, Roger Cohen has a column up claiming flatly "[d]iplomacy is dead." He feels the U.S. will never achieve a diplomatic accomplishment to rival Nixon's trip to China or the peaceful dissolution of the Soviet Union.  While, I'm inclined to agree on the latter example, I think Mr. Cohen doth protest too much declaring diplomacy dead.

He rightfully criticizes our current age of, "impatience, changeableness, palaver, small-mindedness and an unwillingness to talk to bad guys." He notes the role of professional diplomats has been squeezed in this country because of our post-9/11 focus on non-state actors, which have more visibly involved the armed forces and the CIA, than the State Department. Again, I agree.

But I think he goes too far when he laments the end of realpolitik, but cites Syria as an example of diplomacy failing. I'd tend to think many a realist would size up Syria, even back two years ago, and say there is an not imminent national interest there. Indeed realpolitik isn't for the squeamish, but it seems like that's the cold-hearted analysis driving the lack of U.S. engagement in the country today.

He goes a bit too far when he cites three long standing thorns in the paw of U.S. foreign policy: Cuba, Iran, and Israel-Palestine. These thorns have been lodged for 52, 34, and 65 years respectfully.  And while I'd agree sometimes these three issues are used to scare up domestic constituencies  I think to cite them as diplomatic failures is to ignore the facts.

In Cuba, we had a dictator that was uninterested in seeking a change in relations with us for nearly all the 52 years of the dispute. But now with a new leader there has been some thawing out of relations with revised travel permissions and a continentially slow creep of capitalism into the country. You must have a willing partner to make a diplomatic break through and I'd dare say slow and steady still wins this race.

In Iran, much like Cuba, we find a ruling authority quite disinterested in making peace with us. And yet, diplomacy has happened around the edges. Have we normalized relations? No. Have we convinced Iran to give up any supposed nuclear ambitions? No. But you can't call the ballgame in the third quarter.

With respect to Israel and Palestine, you're dealing with two parties whose own political machinations have made a lasting peace agreement fall in and out of vogue. This is an old conflict and America isn't quite seen as an honest broker. It's hard to fix something so entrenched, which is why so many past efforts have failed  To declare diplomacy dead because the U.S. hasn't facilitated a peace agreement in the Middle East is to raise the bar to dizzying heights and tell the competitor to jump flat footed from the floor.

Mr. Cohen also dismisses two big diplomatic successes, namely Burma and Libya. He mentions Burma but glosses over how the U.S. diplomatically engineered the opening up of the country with carrot extended only in reward for desirable behavior. It was peaceful, it was orderly, and it appears to be genuine. If that's not diplomacy in action, I don't know what is.

With regard to Libya, I'm talking Libya 2003 when Gaddafi voluntarily gave up nuclear weapons without a shot fired. Again, this is a success story for diplomacy, even more so given what would follow eight years later. Imagine a nuclear armed Libya disintegrating into revolution. Surely that we avoided such a scenario should prove diplomacy isn't dead.

Indeed, diplomacy isn't dead. It's alive and well and working all over the world.  As we look to continue to manage the Arab Spring, as we look to manage a rising China, and as we face all manner of international challenges, we know there are diplomats around the world engaging in diplomacy. It's not often flashy, it's unlikely to be trending on Twitter, but it's happening nonetheless and we'll see it from time to time when the moment is right.